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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Affirmative Action in Higher Education Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003).
INTRODUCTION

Barbara Grutter, a Caucasian resident of Michigan, applied to the
University of Michigan Law School (Law School) in 1996.' Ms. Grutter had
a 3.8 undergraduate Grade Point Average (GPA) and a 161 Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) score.2 After placing her on a waiting list, the Law
School ultimately rejected Ms. Grutter's application under its race-conscious
admissions program a In December 1997, Ms. Grutter filed suit against the
Law School and its affiliates in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan." She alleged that the Law School racially discriminated against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 5
The Law School ranks among America's top law schools and receives over 3,500 applications each year for a class of approximately 350
students.6 From these applications, the Law School selects the strongest
candidates who will make a diverse contribution to the class.7 The Law
School's admissions policy does not define which diversity contributions
receive "substantial weight," but it does voice a commitment to racial and
ethnic diversity, particularly to underrepresented groups such as AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans. The Law School seeks to
enroll a meaningful number, or "critical mass," of such underrepresented
minority students in each entering class.9 The "critical mass" is not a set
number of students; it is any number sufficient to allow minority students to

1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
Id. at 2331.
7.
Id. The Law School seeks students with a variety of backgrounds and experience
who can learn from each other. Id. The Law School recognizes several bases for diversity in
admissions, including a "longstanding commitment to racial and ethnic diversity." Id. at
2332.
8. Id. at 2332.
9.
Id. In the years 1995 through 1999, the percentages of admitted applicants who were
African-American were 9.4%, 9.2%, 8.3%, 7.9%, and 7.1% respectively. Id. at 2368
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The percentages of admitted applicants who were Hispanic over
the same years were 5.0%, 4.6%, 3.9%, 4.2%, 3.8%, and 4.2%. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The percentages of admitted applicants who were Native-American were 1.2%, 1.1%,
1.6%, 1.4%, 1.0%, and 1.1%. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). These figures roughly represent
the percentages of applicants from each of the three underrepresented minority groups over
the years in question. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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feel comfortable discussing issues rather than being "isolated or like spokespersons for their race."'"
The Law School uses a "flexible assessment" of each applicant to
reach its "critical mass" goals." In addition to the LSAT score and GPA, the
Law School considers "soft" variables like "the enthusiasm of the recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, residency, leadership and work experience, unique talents or
interests, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection."'"
Any or all of these variables can compensate for an applicant's low academic record or LSAT score, and membership in an underrepresented minority group is viewed as just another positive "soft" variable in an applicant's file. 3
Despite individualized consideration of numerous variables, race
remains a significant factor in admissions decisions. 4 During the peak admissions seasons of the years in question (1995-2000), the Law School's
Admissions Director frequently consulted daily reports tracking the racial
and ethnic composition of the class." This enabled him "to ensure that a
critical mass of underrepresented minority students would be reached so as
to realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body."' 6 The desired
educational benefits include stimulating classroom discussions, exposure to
a variety of viewpoints, and an' 7enhanced educational experience "both inside and outside the classroom."'
Applying strict scrutiny to Ms. Grutter's Equal Protection claim, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that
the Law School's policy was unlawful because assembling a diverse student
body was not a compelling state interest under Regents of the University of
10.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 737 (6th Cir. 2002), af'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
11.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331.
12.
Grutter,288 F.3d at 736.
13.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331-33.
14.
Id. at 2334. Dr. Kinley Lamtz, the petitioner's expert, statistically analyzed admissions data collected by the Law School from 1995 through 2000 to quantify the extent of the
Law School's use of race in admissions decisions. Id. He concluded that minority status is an
extremely significant, but not the predominant, factor in admissions decisions. Id.
15.
Id. at 2333.
16.
Id. At trial, Mr. Dennis Shields, the Director of Admissions, maintained that he did
not attempt to admit any particular percentage of minority students; however, he confirmed

that at least eleven percent of the class was comprised of African-American, Hispanic, and
Native-American students during his tenure. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832
(E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd en banc, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
17.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334. The Law School explained that diversity enhances educational experiences because "when a critical mass of minority students are present, racial
stereotypes are dismantled because non-minority students see that there is no 'minority viewpoint;' they see, in other words, that there is a diversity of viewpoints among minority students" and begin to understand one another. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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Californiav. Bakke.'8 Moreover, even if it were, the court held that the Law
School's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve its interest
in diversity. 9
The Law School appealed, contending that its interest in assembling
a diverse student body was compelling under Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke, and that its admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.2 ° Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the Law School and reversed the District Court's
decision.2 The Sixth Circuit held that the Law School's policy was narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling state interest of assembling a diverse
student body.22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether racial classifications in the Law School's admissions policy were
unlawful.2" In a five-to-four decision, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
decision and held that "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the
Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
'
from a diverse student body."24
Accordingly, Ms. Grutter's statutory claims
based on Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also failed.25
First, this case note will trace the legal development of the law governing affirmative-action prior to Grutter v. Bollinger. Second, this note
will explain and then analyze the "strict scrutiny" test for affirmative-action
as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Grutter. As part of this
"strict scrutiny" analysis, this case note will argue three points: (1) the Grutter Court conceived and applied a more deferential form of strict scrutiny
18.

Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 872. Bakke was the first United States Supreme Court

case to consider race-conscious admissions programs. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality). Justice Powell authored the final judgment,
but not the opinion of the Court. Id. (Powell, J., plurality). In a portion of his plurality opinion that was joined by no other Justice, Justice Powell found that achieving diversity in university admissions was a compelling state interest. Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J.,
plurality); see
infra notes 48-86 and accompanying text for an in depth discussion of Bakke.
19.
Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
20.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002).
21.
Id. at 752.
22.

Id.

23.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2331 (2003).
24. Id. at 2346.
25. Id. at 2347. Ms. Grutter's Title VI claim failed because Title VI only bars racial
classifications that violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality). Her § 1981 claim
failed because the prohibition against discrimination in § 1981 is co-extensive with the Equal
Protection Clause. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389391 (1982). Since the Court held that the Law School's program did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, neither of Ms. Grutter's statutory claims could succeed. Grutter, 123 S.
Ct. at 2347.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004
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than had been used in prior affirmative-action cases; (2) altering the strict
scrutiny analysis in this manner served to confuse the decision and undermine the well-established strict scrutiny test; and (3) instead of weakening
the strict scrutiny test, the Court should have broken from precedent and
explicitly upheld the Law School's program under intermediate scrutiny.
BACKGROUND

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."26 One key purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause was to protect African-Americans from racial
discrimination.27 Over time, the Equal Protection Clause was steadily extended to apply to all races seeking protection from discrimination.28 Today,
the equal protection guarantees "are universal in their application, to all persons ... without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. ,29

Because not all classifications of people are equally abhorrent under
the Equal Protection Clause, the United States Supreme Court applies varying levels of judicial scrutiny depending on what type of classification is
being made.30 The lowest level of judicial scrutiny is the rational basis review, under which social and economic legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be upheld if it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'"
The rational basis review is a mild judicial standard that "allows the States
wide latitude" in enacting legislation incorporating non-suspect classifications of people.32 A higher level of judicial scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, becomes necessary when the government discriminates against a quasi-

26.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27.
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 71 (1873) ("[The] one pervading purpose [of the
Fourteenth Amendment was] the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him.").
28.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292-93 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) (Chinese); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (Austrian resident aliens); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (Japanese); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476 (1954)
(Mexican-Americans)).
29.
ick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. Today all races must be afforded the equal protection of
the laws, as the Equal Protection Clause no longer provides protection only to minority citizens that have been historically discriminated against. Id.
30.
See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
31.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
32.
Id. at 442 (applying rational basis review to a zoning ordinance excluding group
homes for the mentally retarded); N.Y. Transit Authority v. Breazer, 440 U.S. 568, 571
(1979) (applying rational basis review to the New York City Transit Authority's refusal to
hire methadone users).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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suspect class or classification of people.3 3 A classification becomes quasisuspect when "the [distinguishing characteristic] generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment."3 4 For example, gender classifications are usually considered quasi-suspect because "[r]ather than resting on
meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens [based
on gender] very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of
men and women."3" Finally, the most searching standard, or strict scrutiny,
applies when the government intentionally discriminates against a suspect
class or classification of people.36 Race is considered a suspect classification
because historically "[racial classifications are] so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such con"317
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ....
The United States Supreme Court established the concept of race as
a suspect class in Korematsu v. United States.3" In Korematsu, the petitioner, Fred Korematsu, appealed a criminal conviction for disobeying Exclusion Order No. 34 by remaining in a military zone that persons of Japanese ancestry had been ordered to vacate to protect the West Coast from
espionage and sabotage during World War H." Mr. Korematsu contended

that the exclusion order violated his rights to Equal Protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court considered whether the order, which
applied only to persons of Japanese descent, was justified.4 The Korematsu
Court held that though all state sanctioned racial distinctions are immediately suspect, they are not all unconstitutional. 4 Instead, the Court must
subject such distinctions to the most "rigid scrutiny," or strict scrutiny, to
determine whether they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 Under this strict scrutiny standard, the Court recognized that certain governmental purposes, such as national security during
times of war, can justify the government's use of racial distinctions.43

33.
E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
quasi-suspect gender classifications in Oklahoma statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to
males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen).
34.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
35. Id.
at 441.
36.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to
suspect racial classifications).
37.
Cleburne,473 U.S. at 440.
38.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("It should be noted... that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
39. Id.at 215-17; Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
40. See Korematsu,323 U.S. at 218.
41.
Id.at 216 ("[AIlI legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.').
42. Id.
43.
See id. at 223-24.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004
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Korematsu established race as a suspect classification requiring
strict scrutiny in all Equal Protection cases involving racial classifications."
Despite this precedent, the appropriate level of scrutiny for affirmativeaction cases generated much judicial debate.45 This is because affirmativeaction cases differ from traditional Equal Protection cases like Korematsu,
which often confront malicious racial classifications or have the purpose of
stripping minorities of their constitutional rights. 6 With affirmative-action,
the opposite is true; the classifications are benign, and the Court has harbored reservations about applying strict scrutiny, a very harsh test, to racial
classifications meant to help, rather than hurt, minorities."
No case demonstrates the affirmative-action scrutiny debate better
than Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the first and only
United States Supreme Court case to address affirmative-action in university
admissions prior to Grutter." In Bakke, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis used racial classifications in its admissions process with the goals of increasing the number of minorities in the medical profession, remedying societal discrimination against minorities, and "obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." 9
44. Id. at 216 ("[C]ourts must subject [all racial classifications] to the most rigid scrutiny.').
45.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality)
(applying strict scrutiny to a university admissions program that considered race); see also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,473 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a minority
set-aside program requiring the grantee of federal funds for local public works projects to
reserve at least ten percent of the funds for minority enterprises); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (applying strict scrutiny to a school board's policy of
laying off non-minority teachers before minority teachers); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny to a temporary "one-black-for-one-white"
promotion requirement mandated by an Alabama district court); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to the city's policy requiring
contractors granted city contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of each dollar to minority businesses); Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 597
(1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the Federal Communications Commission program
awarding enhancement for minority ownership), partiallyoverruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all cases of racial distinctions must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny and overruling Metro Broadcastingto the extent that the Court
did not apply strict scrutiny); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2444 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (implying that the majority should not have applied strict scrutiny to a benign
race-conscious undergraduate admissions program designed to help minorities achieve equality).
46.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) (addressing neighborhood restrictive covenants against African-American or Mongolian ownership); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954) (addressing school segregation); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
U.S. 284, 287-88 (1976) (addressing racial segregation in public housing projects).
47.
See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
48.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269 (Powell, J., plurality).
49.
Id. at 306 (Powell, J., plurality). In addition to race, the University of California
considered other factors applicable to both minorities and non-minoritites including the personal interview, recommendations, character, and "matters relating to the needs of the profeshttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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To reach these goals, the University of California maintained two separate
admissions programs: The regular admissions program and the special admissions program." The regular admissions program admitted non-minority
applicants, while the special program selected minority or "economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged applicants."5 The special program operated via a separate committee whose goal was to "recommend special applicants until a predetermined number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted."5 2 This committee insulated special candidates from the regular program, so special and regular candidates were never compared.53
Allan Bakke, a white male applicant, was twice denied admission to
the University of California under the regular admissions program.
Mr.
Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, alleging that the University's special admissions program excluded him from admission on the basis
of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The United States Supreme Court eventually heard his
56
case.

The Bakke Supreme Court decision was exceedingly fragmented.5"
Justice Powell's plurality opinion delivered the final judgment, but not the
opinion of a majority of the Court.58 First, Justice Powell found that Korematsu applied equally to affirmative-action cases, stating, "The Court has
never questioned the validity of [the] pronouncements [made in Korematsu].
Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
sion and society, such as an applicant's professional goals." Id. at 271 n.** (Powell, J., plurality).
50.
Id. at 265 (Powell, J., plurality).
51.
Id. at 272-75 (Powell, J., plurality) (internal quotation omitted).
52.
Id. at 275 (Powell, J., plurality). In 1973 and 1974, the faculty set aside sixteen of the
one-hundred available seats for minorities. Id. at 275 (Powell, J., plurality). In 1973, the
special admissions committee admitted six African-Americans, eight Chicanos, and two
Asians. Id. at 276 n.6 (Powell, J., plurality). In 1974, the committee admitted six AfricanAmericans, seven Chicanos, and three Asians. Id. (Powell, J., plurality).
53.
Id. (Powell, J., plurality).
54.
Id. at 276-77 (Powell, J., plurality). Allan Bakke was fully qualified for admission.
Id. at 277 (Powell, J., plurality). In the years that Mr. Bakke was denied entrance (1973-74),
his average GPA and test scores exceeded the averages of those admitted under both the
regular admissions program and the special program. Id. (Powell, J., plurality). Mr. Bakke
had a 3.44 Science GPA (SGPA) and a 3.46 Overall GPA (OGPA). Id. (Powell, J., plurality).
His Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) scores were 96 Verbal, 94 Quantitative, 97
Science, and 72 General Information. Id. (Powell, J., plurality). For comparison value, the
averages for regular admittees in 1974 were 3.36 SGPA, 3.29 OGPA, 69 Verbal, 67 Quantitative, 82 Science, and 72 General Information. Id. (Powell, J., plurality). During both years,
Mr. Bakke made it to the interview stage of the admissions process, but he was never placed
on a waiting list and was ultimately twice denied entrance. Id. (Powell, J., plurality).
55.
Id. at 277-78 (Powell, J., plurality).
56.
Id. at 269 (Powell, J., plurality).
57.
See id. at 269-421 (Powell, J., plurality); see infra text accompanying notes 58-83.
58.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-421. (Powell, J., plurality).
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for the most exacting judicial examination." 9 Thus Justice Powell advocated a strict scrutiny standard. 60

Strict scrutiny is a two pronged analysis: First, the use of racial
classifications must further a compelling state interest.6 ' Second, the means
by which the compelling goal is achieved must be narrowly tailored to further that goal.62 If a government program incorporating race does not meet
violates the Equal Protection
both of these requirements, then the program
63
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Applying strict scrutiny in Bakke, Justice Powell first found that the
University of California's interest in diversity was compelling." In a portion
of the opinion joined by no other Justice, he stated, "[The attainment of a
diverse student body] clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education." ' However, Justice Powell went on to hold
that the University's dual admissions program based on predetermined racial
quotas was not narrowly tailored to meet its compelling goal.' He felt that
the University's special admissions program, "[which] focused solely on
ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further [the] attainment of genuine
diversity," as it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the compelling goal.67 Justice Powell then described Harvard College's "illuminating
example" of a constitutionally permissible, or narrowly tailored, way to
achieve diversity in the student body. 68 Harvard did not implement target
59.
Id. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality).
60.
See id. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality). Justice Powell noted that all citizens, even white
males like Allan Bakke, are entitled to strict scrutiny. Id. at 294-95 (Powell, J., plurality). He
stated:
[The University of California] urges us to adopt for the first time a more
restrictive view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign.' [However,] it is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than
that accorded others.
Id. (Powell, J., plurality).
E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[Racial] classi61.
fications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.").
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (Powell, J., plurality).
64.
65.
Id. (Powell, J., plurality). In determining that diversity was compelling, Justice Powell relied more on the University's "academic freedom" to choose its own student body than
on the actual benefits of diversity. Id. at 311 (Powell, J., plurality). He noted that academic
freedom, including the freedom of a university to select its own student body, "has long been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." Id. at 312 (Powell, J., plurality).
66.
See id. at 315-20 (Powell, J., plurality).
Id. at 315 (Powell, J., plurality).
67.
Id. at 316 (Powell, J., plurality).
68.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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quotas or separate minority and non-minority applicants.69 Instead, each
applicant was reviewed individually, and race was simply a "plus" in an
applicant's file.70 While Justice Powell refused to condone the University of
California's special admissions program, he also refused to enjoin the University from ever considering race in admissions and maintained that it could
be done constitutionally via a program similar to the Harvard plan."
Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion joined by three other justices." He did not agree that "racial classifications are always suspect and,
consequently, that [the University's reasons needed to be] compelling.""
Instead, he concluded that "racial classifications designed to further remedial
purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,"' or, in other words,
that benign affirmative-action programs should be reviewed under intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.74
Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Brennan would have upheld
the University's program because it was benevolent and could have been
construed to remedy past "deliberate, purposeful discrimination against minorities in education ... ."" Since the Brennan faction felt that the University's existing policy was constitutional, it followed that they agreed with
Justice Powell on the following two issues: First, the University should not

69.
Id. at 316-18 (Powell, J., plurality).
70.
Id. (Powell, J., plurality). Under the Harvard plan, qualities such as "exceptional
personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, or an ability to communicate with
the poor" were all considered pertinent diversifying factors in addition to race. Id. at 317
(Powell, J., plurality).
71.
Id. at 320 (Powell, J., plurality).
72.
See id. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
was joined by Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
73.
Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74.
Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
75.
Id. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
explained that African-Americans had long been denied access to equal education. Id. at 37172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under slavery, sanctions were
imposed against those educating African-Americans. Id. at 371 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Later, the Supreme Court itself condoned school segregation as
late as 1908. Id. at 371 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)). Even though the Court declared such discrimination unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, discrimination persisted because "massive social and private resistance prevented the attainment of equal opportunity" for several
years. Id. at 371-72 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). Justice Brennan reasoned that most of the minority students who applied to the University of California's medical school since it opened in 1968
were born near the time Brown v. Board of Education was decided and clearly suffered from
lingering discrimination. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004
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be prohibited from establishing future affirmative action programs.76 Second, the "Harvard plan" was a constitutional example of such a program, "so
long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body [was] necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination."" Justice Brennan repeatedly stated that remedial purposes were acceptable reasons to consider
race in university admissions programs.7" He did not, however,79directly address whether he viewed diversity as a compelling state interest.
Justice Stevens, also joined by three justices, wrote the third major
opinion in Bakke. 0 Justice Stevens noted that at trial, the University of California admitted that it could not prove that its special admissions program
had not excluded Mr. Bakke from admission."1 Therefore, Justice Stevens
held that the Court had improperly addressed the issues of if and when race
can ever be used in admissions programs because the issue was properly
contained within Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Consequently, Justice Stevens did not address the constitutional issue and held that
Allan Bakke was to be admitted to the University because the University's
76.
Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77.
Id. at 326 n. I (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78.
Id. at 325, 326, 369, 370-71, 372 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
79.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's silence
regarding diversity as a compelling state interest has been interpreted inconsistently by lower
courts. The Fifth Circuit, in finding that diversity was not compelling, viewed Justice Brennan's silence as an intentional lack of support for the concept. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own
vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other
case."). The Sixth Circuit, however, explained that Justice Brennan's concurrence supported
Justice Powell's diversity rational:
Under the Harvard plan, Harvard College justified its race-conscious admissions policy solely on the basis of its efforts to achieve a diverse student body. Harvard's consideration of race could not be constitutional if
it did not further a constitutionally permissible goal; therefore, by indicating that the Harvard plan could be constitutional under its approach, the
Brennan concurrence implicitly-but unequivocally-signaled its agreement with Justice Powell's conclusion that achieving a diverse student
body is a constitutionally permissible goal.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that if the Brennan faction agreed that diversity was compelling, then the
concept had garnered a majority of Bakke votes. Id.
80.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81.
Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82.
Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provided, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race...
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970). Since the federally funded University of California excluded Bakke from admission
because of his race, the program violated Title VI, and according to Justice Stevens there was
no need to address the constitutional issue. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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special admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964.83
Prior to Grutter,lower courts struggled valiantly to interpret the divided Bakke opinions and often applied what is known as the Marks analysis
to determine whether Justice Powell's solitary statement regarding diversity
was binding." In Marks v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
held, "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds."85 Unfortunately, courts applied
Marks inconsistently, so the analysis did not lend any uniformity to the
law. 6
After Bakke, the Court addressed affirmative-action in several noneducational contexts. 7 In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a minority set-aside program in which ten percent of all
federal funds granted for local public works projects had to be reserved for
products and services procured from minority businesses." The Court reviewed the program under intermediate scrutiny, stressing that a lower standard of scrutiny was appropriate because the affirmative-action program
stemmed from a congressional Act, and therefore, the Court had to show
"appropriate deference to the Congress."8 9 Under this deferential standard,
the Court first held that Congress' interest in eradicating prior discrimination
in the nation's local procurement practices was within its Fourteenth

83.
Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Marks itself dealt with pornography and its relation to the First Amendment freedom of expression. Id. at 189-91. Marks
applies to affirmative-action cases only through a test that the Marks Court devised to determine the official holding of a fractured Court. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
85.
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (1977) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
86.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-42 (6th Cir. 2002) (determining, in the Sixth
Circuit, that Justice Powell's strict scrutiny approach, as opposed to Justice Brennan's intermediate scrutiny approach, represented the narrowest grounds under Marks, and therefore,
Justice Powell's opinion that diversity was compelling comprised the controlling rationale for
the Court); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1247-48 (11th Cir.
2001) (finding that Justice Brennan's implicit determination that diversity was at best "important" and not "compelling" was the narrowest or "less far-reaching common ground" under
Marks, and holding that Justice Powell's individual opinion simply did not establish diversity
as a compelling state interest); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that Justice Powell's diversity rationale was the narrowest footing because every
aspect of Justice Brennan's opinion established broader grounds for the use of race in admissions programs, and therefore, diversity was compelling under Bakke).
87.
See infra text accompanying notes 88-136.
88.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,452 (1980).
89.
Id. at 472. The set-aside program stemmed from the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977. Id. at 453.
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Amendment powers. 9° Next the Court addressed whether the means Congress used to achieve its constitutional objective of remedying past discrimination was sufficiently tailored to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.9 As part of
this inquiry, the Court held that though non-minority firms were burdened
by the program's requirements, "such 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent
'
Furthermore, the Court held that the
parties [was] not impermissible."92
program as a whole was neither underinclusive nor overinclusive. 93 Finally,
the Court noted that the program was not defective simply because the requirements could not be waived when minority participation was unavailable. 9' Ultimately, the Court held that the program was sufficiently tailored
to survive the deferential intermediate scrutiny standard. 9
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the Jackson Board of Education's
"role model" program, in which the Board considered race in layoff decisions in an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination by maintaining a stable percentage of minority teachers.' The Court first held that
under strict scrutiny, societal discrimination was not compelling and insisted
upon a showing of prior discrimination by the specific governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of race. 97 Additionally, the Court
found that the preferential layoff program was not narrowly tailored because
of the burden it imposed on non-minority teachers.9" The Court noted that
the Board could have implemented less intrusive alternatives, such as minority hiring goals, to achieve its purpose. 99
The Court applied strict scrutiny to a minority promotions require°° In 1972, the United States District
ment in United States v. Paradise.1
90.

Id. at 478 ("Insofar as the [Minority Business Enterprise] program pertains to the

actions of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its objectives by use of its
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision are within the scope of the [congressional powers].").
91.
Id. at 480.
92. Id. at 484 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976)).
93.
Id. at 485-88. Challengers asserted that the program was underinclusive because it

limited its benefits to specified minority groups rather than all business that had been disadvantaged by discrimination. Id. at 485. Similarly, they asserted that the program was overinclusive because it benefited minority business that had never been discriminated against. Id.
at 486. The Court acknowledged that particular applications of the program had such effects,
but that the general program was at issue, not the "peculiarities" of it. Id.
94. Id. at 489.
95. Id. at 491-92.
96. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270, 274 (1986).
97. Id. at 274.
98.

Id. at 283-84.

99. Id.
100. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987). The ParadiseCourt noted
that it had not yet reached a consensus as to which level of scrutiny was appropriate in affirmative-action cases, but it applied strict scrutiny because the program in question could
pass that test. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that the Alabama Board
of Safety (Board) had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by purposely and systematically excluding African-Americans from its upper ranks.'"' After eleven years, the Board had not yet complied with
the district court's decree to develop a non-discriminatory promotion
procedure, so the district court ordered the Board to remedy its past
discrimination by promoting equal numbers of African-Americans and
Caucasians until African-American representation reached twenty-five
percent or until the Board had developed a promotion procedure that
fairly promoted African-Americans. , 2 The Board challenged the constitutionality of the order, and United States v. Paradisewas eventually heard by the United States Supreme Court.'°3
In Paradise, the Court reiterated its support for specific remedial
purposes as compelling state interests under strict scrutiny and held that the
government "unquestionably [had] a compelling interest" in remedying the
Alabama Department of Public Safety's blatant pattern of past racial discrimination." Next, the ParadiseCourt set forth the following four factors
used to determine whether race-conscious remedies are narrowly tailored:
(1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2)
the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
provisions; (3) the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant market;
and (4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.' °s
The Court applied the factors to the one-for-one minority promotion
requirement and determined that the program was narrowly tailored."o First,
the Court found that the requirement was necessary to eliminate the effects
of the Board's long-term discrimination, ensure compliance with earlier
court decrees ordering the Board to design a non-discriminatory promotions
procedure, and eliminate further delays with regard to such a procedure.' 7
The Court rejected alternatives such as a one-time promotion of four African-Americans and eleven Caucasians or heavy fines against the Board for
its lack of compliance, reasoning that one non-discriminatory promotion was
not sufficient and that the Board obviously found money no object because it
101. Id. at 153.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 167.
105. Id. at 171.
106. Id. at 171-173.
107. Id. at 171-72. The Board insisted that its delay was a result of the difficulty of developing a non-discriminatory promotions policy. Id. at 174 n.21. It asserted that the task was a
time-consuming process usually extending over several years. Id. The Court found these
excuses hollow, which was proven by the fact that the Board made vast improvements to its
policy immediately following the district court's mandatory one-black-for-one-white promotions requirement. Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 1, Art. 10

452

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

had not yet complied despite the expenses associated with the long litigation."' Second, the Court held that the requirement was flexible, as it could
be waived if there were no qualified African-American candidates or if external forces, such a budget cuts, necessitated promotion freezes.'" The
requirement was also temporary; it remained in effect only until the Board
implemented non-discriminatory promotion procedures, which occurred
before the Supreme Court even heard the case."0 Third, the Court determined that the goal of twenty-five percent African-American representation
in the upper ranks was sufficiently related to the twenty-five percent African-American representation in the local labor market."' Finally, the Paradise Court found that the one-for-one promotion requirement did not pose an
unacceptable burden to third parties because it was temporary, extremely
limited, and did not require white employees to carry burdens through layoffs or discharges." 2
The Court further clarified the bounds of what constitutes a compelling state interest in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company."' In applying strict scrutiny to Richmond, Virginia's city program requiring general
contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of each dollar to minority
businesses, Justice O'Connor avowed, "Classifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics [sic] of racial hostility.. '" 4 The Court went on to hold that while
remedying the present effects of agency-specific discrimination was compelling, remedying past societal discrimination was not." 5 Next, the Court proceeded to apply two of the Paradisefactors to determine that the City's program was not narrowly tailored." 6 First, the City had not considered a single
race-neutral alternative to its race-based program." 7 Second, the Court felt
that the thirty percent minority set-aside requirement was a "rigid numerical
quota" in place for administrative convenience only."' The Court found it
' 19
"obvious that such a program [was] not narrowly tailored."

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 172-75.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 179-81.
Id. at 182.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plu-

rality).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality).
Id. at 505-06 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
Id. at 507-08 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
Id. at 507 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
Id. at 508 (O'Connor, J., plurality). The Court noted that the available waiver process

focused solely on whether a Minority Business Enterprise was available to contract rather
than whether a particular minority owned business had ever suffered from past discrimination.
Id. at 508 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Additionally, the city considered bids and waivers indihttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10

14

Huskey: Constitutional Law - Affirmative Action in Higher Education - Str

2004

CASE NOTE

In Metro Broadcastingv. FederalCommunications Commission, the
Court considered whether minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 In order
to increase broadcast diversity, the Commission considered minority ownership in new license proceedings and allowed questionable current license
holders to assign their licenses to approved minority enterprises via "distress
sales.. 2 ' In deciding what level of scrutiny applied, the Court resurrected its
Fullilove rationale: Benign affirmative-action programs specifically approved by Congress require a certain amount of judicial deference, and
therefore, intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.'
Applying intermediate
scrutiny, the Court upheld the FCC's race-conscious program, holding that it
furthered an important governmental interest in increasing the diversity of
broadcast viewpoints, and that the program was substantially related to the
achievement of that interest."
The Court went on to chide the dissent,
which argued that strict scrutiny applied, for refusing to differentiate between benign and malicious uses of race in determining the appropriate
standard of scrutiny. 24 However, the dissent remained strongly opposed to
the level of deference in Metro Broadcastingand maintained that under the
appropriate strict scrutiny2 standard,
diversity was not compelling enough to
5
distinctions.
such
warrant

vidually, so the only explanation for an inflexible thirty percent requirement was administrative convenience. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality).
119. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality).
120.
Metro Broad. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
121.
Id. at 556-58. Normally, a broadcaster whose qualifications to hold a license came
into question could not transfer his or her license until the FCC had resolved any doubts in a
hearing. Id. at 557. The "distress sale" allowed these questionable license holders to transfer
their licenses without a hearing, but only to FCC approved minority owned enterprises. Id.
122.
Id. at 563 ("[W]hen a program employing a benign racial classification is adopted...
at the explicit direction of Congress, we are 'bound to approach our task with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to
provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States ....
' (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,491 (1980))).
123.
Id. at 564-65.
124.
Id. at 565 n. 12. The Court stated:
We fail to understand how Justice Kennedy can pretend that examples of
'benign' race-conscious measures include South African apartheid, the
'separate-but-equal' law at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, and the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry upheld in Korematsu v.
United States. We are confident that an 'examination of the legislative
scheme and its history' will separate benign measures from other types of
racial classifications.
Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)) (internal citations

omitted).
125.
See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the appropriate
[strict scrutiny standard] equal protection doctrine has recognized [one compelling] interest:
remedying the effects of racial discrimination. . . . [I]ncreasing the diversity of broadcast
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The dissent's argument in Metro Broadcastingwas vindicated five
years later in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena. The Adarand Court considered what standard of review should apply to the federal government's
practice of offering financial incentives to general contractors to hire minority owned subcontractors.'2 6 In Adarand, the United States Supreme Court
unambiguously declared that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny."' 2 7 In other words, racial classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest. 2 The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment applying intermediate scrutiny and remanded the case for further proceedings un29
der strict scrutiny.
Adarand overruled Metro Broadcastingto the extent that the Metro
Broadcasting majority had applied the incorrect level of scrutiny; however,
the Court did not address whether the Metro Broadcastingdiversity rationale
would have survived the stricter standard. 3 Despite the sweeping holding,
some justices still felt that strict scrutiny was too harsh a standard for benign
affirmative-action programs. 3 '
Gratz v. Bollinger
The boundaries of the Grutter decision cannot be fully understood
without a brief discussion of Gratz v. Bollinger, a case decided in parallel
with Grutter. In Gratz, the Court considered the legality of the University of
Michigan's use of race in undergraduate admissions.3 2 The Gratz Court
struck down the undergraduate school's admissions process, holding that its
purpose of increasing diversity was compelling under Grutter, but finding
that the program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling purpose.'33 The Court differentiated between Grutter and Gratz by noting that
the Law School did not award any particular weight to race, considering it
one of many factors during individualized review of every candidate;
whereas in Gratz, the undergraduate school automatically awarded twenty
points to every minority applicant before discretionarily flagging certain
viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial,
and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications.").
126. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
127. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
128. E.g., id.
129. Id. at 204.
130. Id. at 227. ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications. . . must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny .... To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.").
131. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I think it is unfortunate that the majority insists
on applying the label 'strict scrutiny' to benign race-based programs.").
132. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
133. Id. at 2428-29.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/10
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applications for individual review. 34 The Court found that the automatic
twenty point bonus was nearly always determinative despite the later opportunity for individualized review. 3 ' The Court held that such inflexibility
made the undergraduate program operate as an impermissible quota system,
which unlike the more flexible Grutter system, was not narrowly tailored
under strict scrutiny.'3 6
PRINCIPAL CASE

Barbara Grutter brought her Fourteenth Amendment suit against the
Law School in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan." 7 The district court, applying strict scrutiny, determined that the
Law School's use of race in admissions decisions was unlawful because the
Law School's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. 3 The district court granted Ms. Grutter's request for

134. Id. In 1999, the Admissions Review Committee (ARC) modified the undergraduate
admissions process to provide additional review for some applications. Id. at 2420. Admissions counselors could, in their discretion, "flag" applications for individual review to determine whether the applicant met the following criteria:
(1) [the applicant was] academically prepared to succeed at the University, (2) [the applicant had] achieved a minimum selection index score,
and (3) [the applicant] possesse[d] a quality or characteristic important to
the University's composition of its freshman class such as high class rank,
unique life experiences, challenges, circumstances, interests or talents,
socioeconomic disadvantage, and underrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography.
Id.
135.
Id. at 2429. To demonstrate that the twenty point bonus was nearly always decisive,
the Court posed a hypothetical in which three students - students A, B, and C - were considered under the program. Id. at 2428-29. Student A was a child of a successful black physician and promised superior academic performance. Id. at 2428. Student B was an AfricanAmerican with lower academic credentials who grew up in the ghetto with semi-literate parents and had an interest in black power. Id. at 2428-29. Student C was a white student with
extraordinary artistic talent. Id. at 2429. Under the undergraduate school's admissions program, student C could only receive five bonus points for his artistic talents, even if they rivaled the great impressionists. Id. However, students A and B would each receive twenty
points without the school having considered their respective characteristics. Id. Student A
would always be admitted because "virtually every qualified underrepresented minority applicant [was] admitted," while student C, a person with unique and diverse qualities that could
give him an edge over students A and B under individualized review, would not be admitted
unless an admissions counselor saw fit to "flag" him. Id. Even if student C was "flagged," he
would still not be compared with student A because student A would have already been
automatically admitted. Id. The Court found that the program worked to admit every African-American applicant who met the minimum admissions criteria regardless of his or her
potential to increase diversity, which was not the case for non-minority applicants. Id.
136.
Id. at 2430.
137.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2333 (2003).
138.
Id. at 2335.
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declaratory relief and enjoined the Law School from using race in its admissions process."'
Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and vacated the injunction."4
The Sixth Circuit first held that according to Marks, Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke established diversity as a compelling state interest.' 4' The Sixth
Circuit also held that since race was merely a "plus" in each applicant's individual evaluation, the Law School's policy was narrowly tailored to meet
its compelling state interest. 42
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
determined that the Law School's policy was indeed narrowly tailored to
achieve its compelling state interest of attaining a diverse student body,
thereby affirming the Sixth Circuit decision. 43 The Court held, "[The
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling [state] interest inobtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
'
body.' "
United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve the
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in [university admissions].' 45 Justice O'Connor,
who delivered the majority opinion, began her analysis with a discussion of
Bakke since it had "served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of
race-conscious admissions policies."'" She candidly acknowledged that the
Bakke opinions were divided and that lower courts had struggled to discern
whether Justice Powell's statement regarding diversity, which was joined by
no other justice, was binding precedent under Marks. 47 Justice O'Connor
then quickly dispensed with the baffling Marks analysis and stated that the
majority endorsed Justice Powell's diversity rational and considered diver-

139. Id.
140. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002).
141.
Id. at 739-42; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Marks analysis.
142.
Grutter,288 F.3d at 746.
143.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 2335.
146.
Id. at 2336.
147. Id. at 2337; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text for an in depth discussion
of Marks.
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sity a "compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions."' 48
Before detailing the Court's sweeping decision, Justice O'Connor
confirmed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for
Grutter, as all racial classifications "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. 1 49 With that in
mind, she admonished that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, fatal in
fact.""' Further, she reminded that under strict scrutiny, the Court understands that not all racial distinctions are equally objectionable and takes
these "'relevant differences' into account."' 15
Turning to the strict scrutiny analysis itself, Justice O'Connor first
addressed the Court's decision to consider the Law School's use of racial
distinctions as a compelling state interest.'52 Her message was clear: Affirmative-action in university admissions is distinguishable from affirmativeaction in other contexts, and in the university setting, the Court will defer to
universities' "educational judgment" in deciding whether diversity is compelling.'53 Justice O'Connor conceded that post-Bakke affirmative-action
cases may have implied that the only compelling purposes were remedial,
but she reminded that those cases did not deal with university admissions
and were inapplicable.' 54 The Court had never held that only remedial pur-

148.
149.

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
Id. at 2337-38.

150. Id. at 2338. Some commentators have accused strict scrutiny of being "strict in theory, fatal in fact," as the only Equal Protection cases to survive strict scrutiny since its inception in Korematsu have been Korematsu and Paradise. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,

86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) ("[Strict Scrutiny is] 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact.").
151. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 228 (1995)). The term "relevant differences" implied that the Court differentiates between benign and malicious programs under strict scrutiny, and therefore, it was unnecessary
to review the Law School's benign program under a lower standard than strict scrutiny. See
id.
152.

Id.

153. Id.
154. Compare id. ("We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School's argument has
been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases decided since
Bakke."), with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (holding that even
remedying societal discrimination was not compelling and that remedial purposes must be
based on past discrimination by the specific government entity in question in order to be
compelling), and United States v. Paradise, 430 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (affirming that remedying past specific discrimination was compelling), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality) (holding, in a case that addressed the use
of race in construction contracts, that racial classifications must be reserved for remedial
settings rather than increased diversity to avoid promoting racial stereotypes), and Metro
Broad. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that increased diversity in the broadcasting industry could never be compelling).
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poses were compelling; nor had it directly addressed affirmative-action in
higher education since its fractured Bakke opinion.'
Justice O'Connor went on to explain that the Court's deference was
not unprecedented and that it was vitally necessary to ensure success in
many sectors of modem society.'56 She emphasized that the benefits of student body diversity are evident not only in the classroom, but also in the
workforce, military, and government leadership. 57 She specifically noted
that large American corporations, such as 3M and General Motors, have
professed a need for their employees to gain "exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."'5 8 Furthermore, she explained that
diversity is essential to the military's ability to provide national security, and
to fulfill that mission, the military must achieve diversity in the education
and training of its officer corps.'59 Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that universities and law schools are the "training ground" for American leaders."
She emphasized that "individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half of
the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate,
and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representa-

155.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338.
156.
Id. at 2339-41. Justice O'Connor cited several cases in which the Court, in recognizing that "universities occupy a special niche in constitutional tradition," deferred to the judgment of university educators. Id. at 2339. For example, in Boardof Curatorsofthe University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the University of Missouri dismissed a student in her final year
of medical study for low academic performance. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82 (1978). The student filed suit, alleging that the school board did
not afford her procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 79. The Court refused
to require judicial hearings in academic dismissals, acknowledging that "dismiss[ing] a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making." Id. at
90. In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, a student was dismissed from the
University of Michigan Inteflex program after failing a qualifying "must pass" examination
with the lowest score ever recorded in the program. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
474 U.S. 214, 214-16 (1985). The student brought suit alleging that his "arbitrary and capricious" dismissal was a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 217. The Court held that in order for the student's claim to
succeed, the University had to have misjudged his fitness to remain in the program and that,
"[the Court] show[s] great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.... [The Court]
may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as
to demonstrate [no] professional judgment." Id. at 225. In Bakke, Justice Powell noted, "The
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of
its student body." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (citation
and internal quotes omitted).
157. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-41.
158.
Id. at 2340 (citing Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Grutter
(Nos. 02-241,02-516)).
159.
Id. (citing Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae at 27, Grutter (Nos.
02-241, 02-516)).
160. Id. at 2341 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
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tives..."6. For all of these reasons, the Court felt comfortable deferring to the
Law School's decision that diversity is indeed compelling.'62
Next, the Court turned to the narrowly tailored prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis to ensure that "'the means chosen [by the Law School] fit
...the compelling goal [of diversity] so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype."" 6 Justice O'Connor again made it clear that university admissions are in a league of their own, and that the narrow tailoring criteria
must be specific to the educational setting." She proceeded to "define the
contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry" with respect to racial distinctions in
university admissions programs and explain how the Law School's program
met each criterion. 6
First, Justice O'Connor explained that a narrowly tailored admissions program cannot operate as a quota system, which means that a university cannot insulate any category of candidates from competition with all
others." A university may consider race as a "plus" in an applicant's record, but it cannot refuse to compare certain candidates to others.'
The
Court found that the Law School's pursuit of a critical mass of underrepresented minority students represented a "permissible goal" rather than a quota
because the Law School did not reserve a fixed number of seats exclusively
for minorities, but simply made a good faith effort to reach its target goals.'6
Based on Justice Powell's holding in Bakke, the Court denied that giving
disproportionate weight to race or paying "some attention to numbers" transforms a narrowly tailored program into a quota program.'6 9 Consequently,
the Court held that the Law School was justified in tracking the racial composition of the class via the "daily reports" in its good faith effort to admit a
critical mass of minority students. 7 '
The Court explained that to avoid a quota, an admissions program
considering race must be flexible enough to evaluate each applicant as an
individual.'
In other words, a university must consider all of each appli161.

Id. (citing Brief for the Assoc. of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 5-6,

Grutter (No. 02-241)).
162.
See id.

163. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., plurality)).
164. Id.
165.

Id. at 2341, 2342-47.

166. Id.
at 2342.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986)
(O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
169. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 317-18, 323 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality)).
170. Id.
171.

Id. at 2342-43.
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cant's qualifications, so race does not define an applicant's file. 172 The Court
noted that by reviewing each and every application, the Law School performed a "highly individualized, holistic review" of each applicant's record,
regardless of the applicant's race. 7 1 Therefore, this method, like the Harvard plan, was "' flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant and to place
them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same [undisclosed] weight.""' 74
The Court explained that the second criterion for a narrowly tailored
admissions program is that that a university must give "serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks."' 75 However, the Court also stated that a university does not have to "exhaust[] every race-neutral alternative" or sacrifice its reputation for excellence to achieve diversity. 76 The Law School
had considered a lottery system or decreasing its emphasis on GPA and
LSAT scores for all applicants. 77 The Court agreed that the Law School
adequately considered and rejected these alternatives because a lottery
would make it impossible to consider each applicant's individual characteristics, and lowering the admissions standards for all students "would require
the Law School to become a much different
institution and sacrifice a vital
'' 7
component of its educational mission. 1
To fulfill the third narrow tailoring requirement, a race-conscious
admissions program cannot "unduly harm members of any racial group."' 79
Justice O'Connor explained that non-minorities were not unduly burdened
by the Law School's admissions policy because the Law School evaluated
each candidate individually. 0 In considering a range of diversifying factors, non-minority applicants who possessed great potential to enhance diversity could be selected over minority8applicants, and thus, applicants of all
races were provided equal opportunity.' '
Finally, the Court stipulated that all race-conscious admissions programs must have a time limit because no matter how compelling the goal,
such programs should be employed no longer than the time necessary to
sustain the compelling goal. 8 2 Though the Court technically required
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 2343.
Id. at 2343-44 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., plurality)).
Id. at 2345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2345-46.
Id.
Id. at 2346.
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schools using race-conscious admissions policies to fulfill this criterion,
Justice O'Connor explained that universities do not have to meet hard deadlines.'
Instead, they can use "sunset provisions" and "periodic reviews to
determine whether racial preferences are still necessary."' 8 4 The Court
trusted the Law School to terminate its race-conscious admissions program
"as soon as practicable," and encouraged all universities using raceconscious admissions to draw from the alternate knowledge gained by those
universities whose state laws prohibit them from using race. 5 As a final
point, the Court predicted that race-conscious admissions programs will be
unnecessary in twenty-five years due to the
gradual increase in minority
86
applicants with high grades and test scores.
Ultimately, a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
the Law School's race-conscious admissions policy was constitutional, as
the "Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly
tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest
in obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
187
body."'
The Dissents
The majority decision met strong opposition from the remaining justices in four separate dissenting opinions. 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the first dissent and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. 9 Justice Kennedy independently authored the second.'" Justices
Scalia and Thomas authored the third and fourth, respectively, with each
joining the other's opinion."'
A pervading point among the dissents was that the majority had not
applied a true strict scrutiny analysis. 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference."' 93 The Chief Justice also pointed out that in Adarand, the Court "rejected calls to apply more

183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id. at 2346-47.
187. Id. at 2347.
188.
Id. at 2365contd-65. Note that the page numbers of the dissenting opinions appear to
be out of sequence. However, the pagination accurately reflects the pagination of the original
published document. Id. at 2348contd.
189.
Id. at 2365contd-48contd (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190.
Id. at 2370-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191.
Id. at 2348contd-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 235065 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192.
Id. at 2365contd-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193.
Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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lenient review" based on whether a program was benign or malicious because more than benign motives should be required when the government
allocates its resources via a racial classification system.'94 Therefore, he
found that such lenient review in Grutterwas inappropriate.'95
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that under a true strict scrutiny
analysis, the Law School's admissions program was obviously not narrowly
tailored for two reasons: The Law School's "critical mass" theory concealed
a racial quota system, and the program was not limited in duration."9 To
expose quotas within the Law School's "critical mass" theory, Chief Justice
Rehnquist focused on statistics which revealed that from 1995 through 2000
the percentage of applicants that were admitted nearly mirrored the percentage of actual applications received from candidates of each underrepresented
minority race.' 97 For example, in 1995, 9.7% of the applicants were AfricanAmerican, and 9.4% of the admitted applicants were African-American.'
Similarly, 5.1% of the applicants were Hispanic, and 5.0% of the admitted
applicants were Hispanic.'" Finally, 1.1% of the applicants were NativeAmerican, and 1.2% of the admitted applicants were Native-American. °'
The Chief Justice reasoned that if a "critical mass" of each underrepresented
minority was necessary to prevent students from "feel[ing] isolated or like
spokespersons for their race," then a similar number of students would be
necessary to accomplish this purpose for each minority.20 ' He felt that the
disparity in representation demonstrated that the Law School's "'critical
mass' [was] simply a sham" to disguise unconstitutional quotas.0 2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist also pointed out the lack of "any reasonably precise time
limit on the Law School's use of race in admissions. '2 3 He felt that the majority, in simply deferring to the Law School's judgment as to when the program should end, permitted the program on a "seemingly permanent basis"
even though prior precedent explicitly required a "limit on the duration of
programs
such as this because discrimination on the basis of race is invidi' ' 20 4
ous.

The dissenters were divided regarding whether diversity could ever
be compelling: Justice Kennedy implied that he would have approved of
194. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 226 (1995)).
195. See id. at 2365contd-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2366-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2367-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2368 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201.
Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2367 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2369 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2369-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.

149, 171(1987)).
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diversity as a compelling state interest had the majority applied a true strict
scrutiny test, while both Justices Scalia and Thomas maintained that diversity could never be compelling under strict scrutiny. °5 Justice Rehnquist
remained silent.2° Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, suggested that
appreciation for diversity can never be taught; it is one of life's lessons that
should be learned by "people three feet shorter and twenty years younger
than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School .... ,207
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, felt that the educational benefits
derived from diversity could not be significant, let alone compelling, if the
Law School refused to alter its admissions standards to achieve diversity for
fear of losing its elite status. 2° ' He reasoned, "If the Law School is correct
that the educational benefits of 'diversity' are so great, then achieving them
by altering admissions standards should not compromise its elite status. ' 2°9
To Justice Thomas, the Law School's interest in the educational benefits
derived from student body diversity did not ring true because these benefits
could be accomplished by lowering the Law School's admissions standards,
and thus, admitting more minorities.2 '0 The Law School's refusal to do this
implied that its actual purpose was improving racial "aesthetics," or achieving a racially diverse appearance while remaining an elite institution.21'
Justice Thomas found this unacceptable because he felt that Michigan did
not have a compelling interest in having a public law school at all, let alone
12
an elite one.
Justices Scalia and Thomas also predicted probable consequences of
the majority decision.
Justice Scalia noted that the ambiguous "split double header" of Grutter and Gratz would prolong affi-mative-action litigation
205.
Compare id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to [apply] strict scrutiny to the use of race in university admissions, it negates my
authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity."), with id. at 2349 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Diversity] is a lesson of life rather than law."),
and id. at 2352 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Where the Court has
accepted only national security and rejected even the best interests of a child, as ajustification
for racial discrimination, I conclude that only those measures the State must take to provide a
bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a [compelling state interest].").
206.
See id. at 2365contd-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207.
Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208.
Id. at 2353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2348-49
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209.
Id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210.
Id. at 2353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212.
Id. at 2354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
noted that Alaska, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island do not have
public, American Bar Association (ABA) accredited law schools. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). He deduced that if the state had no compelling interest in state
sponsored law schools at all, it could not possibly have a compelling interest in diverse or
elite law schools. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213.
See infra text accompanying notes 214-16.
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because further litigation would be required to define the boundaries of each
case's precedent.21 4 Justice Thomas predicted that the majority decision
would push universities to rely on affirmative-action to achieve diversity
rather than encourage them to experiment with non-discriminatory methods
of achieving the same goal.2"' In a final caveat, he indicated that minority
students aware of their significant racial advantage have no incentive to
study to excel on the LSAT, thus the majority decision may cause the numerical disparities between minorities and non-minorities to grow.2t6
ANALYSIS

In Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court recited its
strict scrutiny analysis but did not apply it.2" 7 While the Court legitimately
found student body diversity to be a compelling state interest, it applied a
flexible and deferential narrow tailoring test that bears little resemblance to

the standard historically used under the strict scrutiny analysis."s This approach enabled the Court to uphold the Law School's program while avoiding an explicit departure from Adarand,which required the Court to review
all racial classifications under strict scrutiny.21 9 Unfortunately, altering the
strict scrutiny test in this way confused the decision, undermined the well
established strict scrutiny analysis, and invited the interpretive litigation that
will surely be necessary to define the boundaries of the modified strict scrutiny test.220 Rather than further confound an already bewildering line of case
law, the Court should have explicitly broke from precedent and upheld the
Law School's benign use of racial classifications under intermediate scrutiny.221

214.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia pointed to several areas of ambiguity between the Grutter and Gratz decisions.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He felt that some of the future litigation would focus on whether the challenged program contained sufficient individual review
and avoided separate admission tracks so as to fall under Grutter and not Gratz. Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also noted that more definition will be necessary to determine the difference between achieving a "critical mass" through "good faith
efforts" under Grutter and an outright quota system under Gratz. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, he noted that the minority
groups not traditionally benefited by race-conscious admissions are bound to seek retribution.
Id. at 2350 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215.
Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
University of California, Berkeley did not fall apart after being required by state law to
achieve diversity through non-discriminatory means).
216. See id. at 2364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217.
See id. at 2341-46.
218.
See infra text accompanying notes 227-71.
219.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
220.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see infra notes 272-90 and accompanying text.
221.
See infra text accompanying notes 291-305.
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Modified Strict Scrutiny
As previously mentioned, a program using racial classifications will
withstand strict scrutiny only if it fulfills two requirements: The use of race
must further a compelling state interest, and the means by which the compelling goal is achieved must be narrowly tailored to further that goal.222 In
Grutter, the Supreme Court justifiably held that diversity in university admissions is a compelling state interest for two reasons: First, this decision
did not conflict with any prior precedent.2 23 Second, as Justice O'Connor
persuasively explained, diversity in university admissions must be considered compelling for various social and economical reasons.224 Despite
moral, ethical, and political opposition, diversity in American education, as a
practical matter, remains an essential part of the multi-racial society that we
live in. " Unfortunately, America has not reached that exalted state where
diversity can be consistently achieved without the limited use of race as a
factor, thus the Court was bound to consider diversity in education compelling.226
While the Grutter Court's decision to consider diversity a compelling state interest can be reconciled with its prior precedent applying strict
scrutiny, the Court's malleable narrow tailoring test did not comport with its
habitually severe narrow tailoring inquiry.227 Under United States v. Paradise, the Court set forth four factors to consider when determining whether a
race-conscious program is narrowly tailored. 228 The Grutter Court custom222. E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 ("[Racial] classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.").
223. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39. As Justice O'Connor noted in Grutter,the divided Bakke opinions were unintelligible and therefore had little influence on whether or not
diversity in university admissions could be compelling. Id. at 2337, 2338-39; see supra notes
146-48 and accompanying text. Further, the Court never considered affirmative-action in
university admissions in its cases between Bakke and Grutter, so the question went unanswered. See supra notes 26-136 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court's post-Bakke
inferences suggesting that only remedial purposes were compelling were not applicable because of the substantially original character, needs, and rights of universities and their admissions programs. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339; see supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
Essentially, the Supreme Court successfully avoided the issue for twenty-five years between
Bakke and Grutter, leaving the Grutter Court free to hold that diversity in university admissions is a compelling state interest without straining the limits of strict scrutiny. See Grutter,
123 S. Ct. at 2339.
224. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-41; see supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
225. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-41.
226.

See id.

227. See id. at 2341-46; id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal. In the context of university admissions the objective of racial diversity can
be accepted based on empirical data known to us, but deference is not to be given with respect
to the methods by which it is pursued .... The majority today refuses to be faithful to the
settled principle of strict review designed to reflect these concerns.").
228. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987); see supra text accompanying
note 104-12 for a detailed discussion of the four factors and their traditional application.
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ized the Paradisefactors to fit the educational setting in order to consider
the "distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity....
."" Customizing the factors was reasonably justifiable in light of the
unique position that universities inhabit."0 However, an examination of the
Grutter Court's application of each customized criterion illustrates that the
new narrow tailoring test scarcely resembles the test that the Court had repeatedly applied in prior precedent.
First, the Court held that a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota."' To meet this criterion, the Court explained that a program
cannot reserve a specified number of seats for minorities nor have separate
tracks for minorities and non-minorities, and every applicant must be given
individual consideration that acknowledges all the defining features of his or
her application.232 The "no quota" requirement initially seemed loyal to
strict scrutiny, but the Court went on to explain that while quotas are unconstitutional, "permissible goal[s]" pursued in good faith are acceptable.233
Therefore, the Law School's good faith quest for a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students was permissible.'
In deciding that the Law School employed a "permissible goal"
rather than a quota, the Court glossed over several facts indicating otherwise." First, the Court held that the "critical mass" system itself did not
"transform the [Law School's] program into a quota" despite the Law
School's incessant monitoring of the "daily reports" tracking the racial and
ethnic composition of the class. 6 The Court also downplayed Dr. Kinley
Larntz's conclusion that minority status was an "extremely strong" factor in
admissions decisions.7
Finally, the majority neglected to even address
Chief Justice Rehnquist's uncanny statistical evidence showing that the Law
School's "critical mass" concept masked an outright racial balancing system."3 These factors were significant because they revealed that, despite the
229.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341; id. at 2341-46. The Grutter Court set forth the following
four factors to be used in determining whether a race-conscious admissions program is narrowly tailored: (1) the program cannot operate as a quota and must be flexible enough to
afford each applicant individual review; (2) a university must give good faith consideration to
race-neutral alternatives; (3) a race-conscious admissions program cannot unduly injure nonpreferred groups; and (4) all race-conscious admissions programs must have a time limit. Id.;
see supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
230. See supra note 156 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique constitutional position of universities.
231.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342.
232.
Id. at 2342-43.
233.
Id. at 2342.
234. Id. at 2343.
235.
Id. at 2342-44.
236.
Id. at 2343.
237. Id. at 2334 (internal quotations omitted).
238.
Id. at 2367-69 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (showing that, during the years in question,

the percentage of admitted applicants from each underrepresented minority group consistently
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fact that the Law School did not explicitly reserve a number of seats for minorities each year, the Law School's program operatedas a quota as Justice
Powell defined it in Bakke. 9 Justice Powell defined a quota as the "purpose
[to] assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular
group merely because of its race ... ."" The evidence strongly indicated
that the Law School did exactly that by attempting to racially engineer its
student body.24 Yet the Court, under what it termed strict scrutiny, minimized the weight of the evidence, concentrated on the Law School's individualized review, and found that the Law School did not employ a quota.242
In essence, the GrutterCourt instructed schools to design affirmative-action
programs that enable them to admit predetermined numbers of minorities as
blatantly prohibited by Bakke, but to vaguely define their "goals" and provide sufficient individualized review so as to avoid the "quota" label.243 This
instruction defied the Court's own quota criterion, which provided that "a
race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system. ' 2 The ambiguous instruction also failed to provide schools with the direction necessary to confidently design narrowly tailored affirmative-action programs

matched the percentage of individuals in the Law School's applicant pool from the same
groups); see supra text accompanying notes 196-202 for a discussion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statistical evidence.
239.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality). In Bakke, the University of California reserved a predetermined number of seats
for minorities each year, and Justice Powell held that this method constituted an unconstitutional quota because non-minority applicants were not given a chance to compete for those
seats. Id. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality). In Grutter,the Law School did not technically
reserve a number of seats for minorities, but in reality, the evidence showed that a percentage
of seats were reserved for minorities each year. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2367-69
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court ignored this evidence and declared that the Law
School's program was nothing like the University of California's program in Bakke. Id. at
2342-43.
240. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., plurality).
241.
See supra text accompanying notes 236-40.
242.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-44. The true flexibility of the supposedly rigid analysis employed by the Court is demonstrated by the Grutter-Gratz split. The undergraduate
admissions program considered in Gratz was similar to the Law School's program in that it
did not reserve a predetermined number of seats for minorities. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411, 2419 (2003). Instead minority applicants were awarded twenty points out of a possible
150 points for their minority status. Id. As in Grutter,the advantage given minority students
was usually determinative in admittance decisions, but not always. Id. at 2427-29. However,
the Gratz Court distinguished the undergraduate program from the Law School program,
finding that it operated as a quota due to a lack of individualized review for every candidate.
Id. at 2428. Applying the same strict scrutiny standard, the Court upheld the Law School
program and struck the undergraduate program when each had the same goal, the same effect,
and largely similar logistics. Compare Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341-47, with Gratz, 123 S. Ct.
at 2427-31.
243.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-44.
244. Id. at 2342.
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because it did not define the boundary between a goal and a quota or to what
extent individualized review is required.245
The Court's second narrow tailoring criterion required the Law
School to give "serious, good faith consideration" to alternatives that would
achieve diversity, but it did not require the Law School to use them if their
use would force the Law School to "abandon the academic selectivity" that
maintained its excellent reputation.'" Thus, the Court held that the Law
School reasonably refused to lower its emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores
or use a lottery system, two viable and less intrusive alternatives, because
such alternatives would threaten its elite status.247 United States v. Virginia
illustrates that this approach was atypical of the traditional narrowly tailored
analysis.24 In United States v. Virginia, the Court, applying a standard
lower than strict scrutiny, required the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to
radically reshape its all male admissions process and adversarial character to
accommodate female students.249 Similar to the Law School's argument that
lowering its reliance upon GPA and LSAT scores would sacrifice its educational mission to provide an elite education, VMI argued that admitting
women would greatly alter its distinctive adversarial character.250 Nevertheless, the Virginia Court, unlike the Grutter Court, refused to defer to the
school's judgment and held that the radical changes were "manageable" under the lower standard.25 ' Requiring VMI to admit women to a school that
had carefully designed its educational model around a male student body for
over a century arguably involved a dramatically greater sacrifice in academic
character than would requiring the Law School to lessen its reliance on numerical scores that, if considered alone, cannot provide the Law School with
the caliber of students it seeks.252 The Virginia Court, under a standard
245.
See id. at 2342-44.
246. Id. at 2345.
247.
Id.
248.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (reviewing a gender-based government classification under an "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard, a standard
lower than strict scrutiny).
249. Id. at 540. The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was a state supported school meant
to educate "citizen-soldiers." Id. at 520. The all male school employed an adversarial teaching method, which was modeled after military boot camp. Id. at 520. The model was characterized by "physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, [and] absence of
privacy .... Id. at 522 (internal quotations omitted). For over 100 years, VMI refused to
accept females because it felt women were less equipped to handle the severe teaching methods and because the single-gender education significantly contributed to the school's distinctive teaching style. See id. at 524, 540. Under an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
standard, a standard between intermediate and strict scrutiny, the Court held that VMI's use
of gerder classifications violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and r quired VMI to alter its long-established teaching model to accommodate women. Id. at
531,558.
250.
Id. at 540.
251.
Id.at 551 n.19.
252. Compare id.("Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements and to
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lower than strict scrutiny, required a university to sacrifice central aspects of
its educational mission and character in order to implement the least intrusive means of accomplishing a goal."' The Grutter Court ignored this prior
precedent and allowed the Law School to bypass its viable alternatives
sim24
ply to maintain its elite status under its narrow tailoring analysis.
The Court's third requirement, that an admissions program cannot
unduly burden members of any racial group, was also applied leniently.255
The Court held that the Law School's program did not unduly burden nonminority students because it evaluated a number of diversifying factors and
sometimes selected non-minority applicants with diverse potential over minority applicants.25 6 Therefore, the Court found that all students competed
on equal footing, and non-minority students did not carry any additional
burden. 7 In making this decision, the Grutter Court again ignored expert
testimony and statistical evidence indicating that race was typically determinative, and that from a practical standpoint, minorities and non-minorities
were not on equal footing.25 For example, if two students had identical
"soft" qualifications and were in the lower range of LSAT scores and grades,
but one student was an underrepresented minority while the other was not,
the minority student would without question be admitted over the nonminority student.25 9 This inequality violated strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring
analysis as previously applied by the Court.2"
Finally, and perhaps in its most flagrant disregard for strict scrutiny,
the Court held that narrow tailoring does not require the Law School's admissions program to have a time limit. 26' The Court held that universities
adjust aspects of the physical training programs... [which is] manageable [and reasonpbly
required under the exceedingly persuasive justification standard]."), with Grutter, 123 S.Ct.
at 2332, 2344 (holding that narrow tailoring does not require a law school to jeopardize its
reputation for excellence by lowering its emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores when even "the
highest possible score[s]" do not guarantee that an applicant has the qualities that the school
seeks).
253.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 558.
254.
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2345.
255. See id. at 2346; see infra text accompanying notes 256-60.
256.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. The Law School did not offer evidence indicating how
often diverse non-minority students were chosen over minority students. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2334 (indicating that minority status was an "extremely strong factor" or "extremely large allowance" for admission) (internal quotations omitted); see id. at 2367-69
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (indicating that the program operated as a quota that excluded nonpreferred groups from a percentage of seats each year); see supra text accompanying notes
11-13 for a discussion of "soft" variables.
259.
See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
260.
See id.at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[R]ace [cannot] become a predominant
factor in the admissions decisionmaking. The Law School failed to comply with this requirement, and by no means has it carried its burden to show otherwise by the test of strict
scrutiny.").
261.
Id. at 2346.
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can meet the narrow tailoring durational requirement through sunset provisions and "periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still
necessary .... ,,262 Prior to Grutter,the Court held that racial-classifications
in only two cases, Korematsu and Paradise,were sufficiently tailored to
survive strict scrutiny, and both of those programs had time limits. 26a In

Korematsu, the Japanese exclusion order remained in effect during the
United States' war with Japan. 2" In Paradise,the one-black-for-one-white
promotion requirement remained in effect only until the Board designed a
non-discriminatory promotions plan, which occurred before the Supreme
Court heard the case.265 In yet another departure from prior precedent, the
Grutter Court virtually dispensed with the time limit requirement in the university admissions context and allowed the Law School the discretion to end
its race-conscious program "as soon as practicable." 266
Though the Court has asserted that strict scrutiny does not have to be
fatal, strict scrutiny has historically been fatal to affirmative-action programs
in all contexts, including higher education.26 7 Only once between its 1945
inception in Korematsu and its application in Grutter has an affirmativeaction program survived both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis. 2" In
reality, the test has been "strict in theory, fatal in fact" as acknowledged by
scholars and Supreme Court Justices alike.269 The level of deference shown
by the GrutterCourt in determining that the Law School's admissions policy
was narrowly tailored was indeed extraordinary because the Court's analysis

262.
Id.
263.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987).
264.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219-20.
265.
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987).
266.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346.
267.
Id. at 2338 (noting that "[a]lthough all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
268.
Paradise,480 U.S. at 166-67. The ParadiseCourt held that a minority promotion
program passed strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest. Id. However, the goal of the Paradiseprogram was to remedy past specific discrimination, a goal the Court had previously approved more than once. Id. at 167. Paradise
also presented extenuating circumstances: The plaintiff challenging the government use of
race, or the Alabama Board of Safety, had for eleven years refused to obey a federal court
order to design a non-discriminatory promotions program, so the district court finally mandated a minority promotions requirement to force the Board into compliance. Id. at 153. The
Supreme Court was naturally frustrated with the Board's refusal to cooperate with the district
court, so it used strict scrutiny to uphold the district court's authority to make the Board comply. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text. Before Grutter, the Court showed no
leniency in cases with more reasonable plaintiffs like those in Bakke, Wygant, and Croson.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-71, 96-99, 113-19.
269.
Gunther, supra note 150, at 8 (describing strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, fatal in
fact"); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 518 (Marshall, J., concurring) (.'[S]trict scrutiny' [is] scrutiny
that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.").
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in Grutterlooked nothing like the Court's prior narrow tailoring analyses. 270
Grutter constituted a vast departure from prior precedent that will forever
" '
distort the narrow tailoring analysis.27
The Consequences
Skewing the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny confused the
Grutterjudgment and undermined the test itself.272 The Grutter decision is
unclear due to the above discussed flexibility that the Court integrated into
the once rigid narrow tailoring test.273 Such flexibility creates ambiguities
that will "prolong the controversy and the litigation" surrounding affirmative-action because courts must now clear the confusion created by the Grutter decision by defining the boundaries of this new narrow tailoring test.274
Courts will be forced to outline such substantive issues as what exactly constitutes a quota system, how much individualized evaluation is required in
light of limited time and resources, how frivolously can race-neutral alternatives be cast aside, how much of the burden are non-minorities expected to
shoulder, and how may schools be restrained from operating perpetual affirmative-action programs.275 These uncertainties abound while American
universities scramble276to design affirmative-action programs with the hopes
that they get it right.

270.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's analysis of the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny was "unprecedented in its deference"); id.
at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court, in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory,
accepts the University of Michigan Law School's assurances that its admissions process
meets with constitutional requirements. The majority fails to confront the reality of how the
Law School's admissions policy is implemented.").
271.
See supra text accompanying notes 231-66 for a discussion detailing how the narrow
tailoring criteria were applied in the past as opposed how they were applied in Grutter.
272.
See infra text accompanying notes 273-90.
273.
See supra text accompanying notes 231-66.
274. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275.
See id. at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Erwin
Chemerinsky, October Term 2002, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 369 (2003) ("The Michigan affirmative action cases will not end litigation over affirmative action in education. There is a
large grey area between allowing race to be used as a factor and prohibiting the assignment of
points based on race.").
276. Jonathon R. Alger, Diversity issues and the Affirmative Action Debate After Grutter
and Gratz, 5-7 (Sept. 13, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The University
of Michigan manuscript distributed to law school admissions professionals across the country
began by addressing the many issues that schools now face under the Grutter Court's narrow
tailoring review. Id. Mr. Alger presented several questions that schools must now consider
when designing constitutional affirmative-action programs: (1) whether the review process is
individualized and holistic for each applicant; (2) whether factors considered relate to diversity, aside from race and national origin; (3) how race is considered - e.g., how race is
weighted in the process, and which racial and ethnic groups are considered a "plus" factor; (4)
how race is considered with regard to students of "mixed race;" (5) whether cut-off scores
(for grade-point averages or standardized test scores) are used to make automatic decisions at
either end of the spectrum to admit or reject applicants; (6) whether the institution has a guid-
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Perhaps more daunting is the fact that the Grutter decision diluted
the strict scrutiny analysis itself.277 Before Grutter, the Court consistently
applied strict scrutiny in every case that required it, but after Grutter, the
meaning of strict scrutiny is indefinite because the Court opened the door to
relaxing the narrow tailoring analysis depending on the merits of the underlying situation, which was education in Grutter.278 No longer is strict scrutiny the enduring, severe test that courts always interpret narrowly in favor
of those being discriminated against.279 Instead, courts can discretionarily
apply strict scrutiny as rigidly or as moderately as desired, an idea that "undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents."2 ° Further, the
" '
Court must now craft the flexible narrow tailoring analysis to fit each case.28
The test will look different each time it is applied, and over time, the single
test may morph into several, effectively destroying the concept of strict scrutiny all together.
Diluting the strict scrutiny analysis is a frightening concept because
it is a step backwards towards a time when strict scrutiny did not exist, a
time when the Court upheld several malicious discrimination policies despite
the existence of the Equal Protection Clause."2 It was the harsh strict scrutiny analysis that finally gave the Court its ability to use the Equal Protection
Clause to prevent government entities from making arbitrary rules that diminished minority rights. 283 Under strict scrutiny, the government must
prove a significant justification for its actions before it is allowed to take

ing principle/target for the enrollment of minority students; (7) whether race-neutral altematives were studied and considered, and if so, whether the reasons behind their rejection were
documented; (8) whether the policy includes periodic reexamination and/or a sunset provision
to consider changes in the structure and composition of the applicant pool; and (9) whether
the conside'ration of race affects the chances of admissions for non-minority students, and if
so, whether that burden is too great. Id.; see also Memorandum for the Ad Hoc Committee
on Post-GrutterIssues from Kent Syverud, Dean of Vanderbilt Law School, to the Faculty of
Vanderbilt Law School 2-3 (August 20, 2003) (on file with author).
277.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278.
Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Before the Court's decision today, we consistently applied the same strict scrutiny analysis.
").
279.
Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that the majority "abandoned or manipulated" strict scrutiny with the effect of distorting its "real and accepted meaning." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
280.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
281.
See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
282.
E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (declaring the 1875 Civil Rights Act,
an Act which prohibited racial discrimination in public places such as inns, restaurants, and

theaters, unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the
power to regulate rights within the "domain of state legislation"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (holding that enforced separation of races did not deny African-

Americans equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
283. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (chartering strict scrutiny
in the Equal Protection context as a test used to ensure that racial classifications which "curtail" the rights of a single racial group are not arbitrary and antagonistic, but are instead pressing enough to justify such restrictions).
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rights away from any racial group. 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist foreshadowed
the danger of injecting flexibility into the strict scrutiny analysis in his dissent.285 He reminded the majority that the purpose of the demanding narrow
tailoring inquiry was to ensure that the use of race fits the compelling state
interest "'with greater precision than any alternative means."' 6 This level
of precision ensured that programs requiringstrict scrutiny were not invidious, and that the method used to achieve the compelling state interest was
both necessary and the most meticulously tailored means available. 87 If
courts can discretionarily apply strict scrutiny with varying degrees of deference depending on the underlying situation being analyzed, then the test
loses its power to demand the precise tailoring that effectively protects
against malicious discrimination .2 8 Essentially, when the next truly malevolent program comes along, the Court may not have the power to strike it
down because such a program could legitimately satisfy the newly weakened
narrow tailoring test.28 9 By inviting judicial deference and discretion into the
narrow tailoring prong of the new "strict scrutiny light," the Court can no
longer effectively protect Americans against malicious discrimination when

called upon to do

so.2"

A Better Solution
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court found itself bound by two opposing policies. First, the Court recognized that diversity in American universities is crucial to the positive development of our nation.29' Second, the Court
was bound by stare decisis to its Adarand precedent requiring it to apply
strict scrutiny, a usually fatal test, to all programs using racial classifications. 2 Hence, the GrutterCourt attempted to balance the need for diver-

284. Id.
See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2365contd. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
285.
286. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality)).
287. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (stating that under strict scrutiny, the challenger is "entitled to

a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear [on the basis of race] is precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest").
288. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2341 ("Even in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest ...the means chosen to accomplish the government's asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to
accomplish that purpose.") (internal quotation omitted).

289. See supra text accompanying notes 277-88.
290. Stephen M. Feldman, Harmonizing the Law and Political Science of Supreme Court
Decision Making 9 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[Tihe Court upheld
the University of Michigan Law School's program under strict scrutiny light, a new type of
judicial scrutiny.").
291. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338-41; see supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.

292. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see supra text accompanying note 149.
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sity in higher education with the requirement that all race-conscious government programs be reviewed under the rigid strict scrutiny analysis.29 a
As previously discussed, the United States Supreme Court engaged
in a lengthy debate regarding the appropriate standard of review for benign
affirmative-action programs before settling on strict scrutiny in Adarand.2"
However, the Adarand Court got it wrong. The muddled Grutter-Gratzresults illustrate that the Court was too hasty in confining itself to the same
standard of review for both benevolent and malicious Equal Protection
cases. 95 Instead of justifying its deference under strict scrutiny with the idea
that universities are "special," the Court should have used the same argument to justify the use of a lower standard of scrutiny.2" In other words,
293.
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2339 ("Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School
is no less strict for taking into account the complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.").
294. See supra text accompanying notes 48-131.
295.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2444-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
her Gratz dissent, Justice Ginsburg insinuated that strict scrutiny should not encompass benign racial classifications. Id. at 2444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She explained that in implementing the Fourteenth Amendment's equality instruction, the government should be
allowed to "distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion [because] [a]ctions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with
measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have
been extirpated." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 316 (1986)). She noted a particularly convincing argument explaining that racial
classifications are not always in parallel with racial oppression:
To say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights
have been mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than
freedom from racial oppression is to trivialize the lives and deaths of
those who have suffered under racism. To pretend ...that the issue presented in Regents of the University ofCalifornia v. Bakke was the same as
the issue in Brown v. Board of Education is to pretend that history never
happened and that the present doesn't exist.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black,
97 YALE L. J. 420, 433-34 (1988)) (internal citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg's central
point was that race has been ranked a "suspect" category not because it is necessarily an impermissible classification in and of itself, as is touted in Adarand and other Supreme Court
jurisprudence, but because racial classifications have typically been made for white supremacy purposes. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It follows that when racial classifications are not
being used to maintain racial inequality, the classifications are not as inherently suspect, and
strict scrutiny may not be necessary. See id. at 2444-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 156-62. The Court found that due to the
unique qualities of universities, both in the "special niche" that universities occupy in constitutional tradition and in the heightened importance of student body diversity, judicial deference was not merely permissible under strict scrutiny, but instead, exemplified the essence of
the test. The Grutter Court stated:
Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
decision-maker for the use of race in that particular context.... Our hold-
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rather than calling its deferential scrutiny "strict," the Grutter Court should
have reexamined the arguments supporting a lower standard, expressly broke
away from its Adarand precedent, and upheld the Law School's program
under a lower standard of scrutiny.
Intermediate scrutiny, or a similarly lower standard, was the logical
choice for a university affirmative-action program like the Law School's,
and the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard applied to gender
classifications in United States v. Virginia provided the Court with the prior
precedent it needed to credibly apply a lower standard.29 Benign racial classifications in university admissions are similar to the gender classifications
in Virginia: Like gender classifications, benign racial classifications are
often used for legitimate purposes, such as increasing diversity or remedying
past discrimination."8 Benign racial classifications are not "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest" that every benign
classification should be "deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy." 2 In
fact, just the opposite is true: Benign racial classifications are typically enacted to benefit racial minorities. 3" The Court could and should have used
the similarities between benign racial classifications and gender classifications to show that a lower standard of review is better suited to the Law
School's benign program and that such benign classifications should not be
subject to the most rigorous review.
Intermediate scrutiny also simply "fits" benign racial classifications
better than strict scrutiny.30' This is because intermediate scrutiny does not
require the government's purpose to be "compelling.""a 2 Nor must the
means used to achieve the government's purpose be "narrowly tailored." '
Instead, intermediate scrutiny requires a program using racial classifications
to be "substantially related" to the achievement of an "important" government purpose, and therefore, the Grutter Court would not have confused and
weakened strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring analysis because it would not
ing today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference
to a university's academic decisions ...

[which is necessary because the

benefits of student body diversity] are not theoretical but real...
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-40.

297. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
298. E.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (attaining diversity is not only legitimate, but compelling); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (remedying past and present
discrimination by a state actor is "unquestionably" a compelling, and not just legitimate, state
interest).
299. See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
300.

See supra text accompanying notes 45-47 for a discussion of the difference between

benign
301.
302.
ment).
303.

and malicious racial classifications.
See infra text accompanying notes 302-05.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgSee id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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have applied it."° Moreover, intermediate scrutiny has traditionally been
applied with a degree of judicial deference, so the Court could have justifiably deferred to the Law School in its admissions decisions under the lower
standard and avoided compromising the strict scrutiny test.3 °5 By effectively
comparing benign racial classifications to gender classifications, the Court
could have persuasively reasoned its departure from Adarand, upheld the
Law School's admissions program under intermediate scrutiny, and at last
effectively recognized that not all racial classifications are created equal.
CONCLUSION

The GrutterCourt had the right goal, but the Grutterdecision cannot
be defined as a step in the right direction. After clearly and affumatively
answering the long-standing question of whether diversity in university admissions is a compelling state interest, the Court distorted its historical strict
scrutiny analysis in arguing that the Law School's program was narrowly
tailored. The narrow tailoring inquiry confused the Court's decision and
called the continuing strength of the strict scrutiny analysis into question. In
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court had the opportunity to explain why university
affirmative-action programs merit a lower standard of review than other
Equal Protection cases and uphold the Law School's program under intermediate scrutiny. Instead, the Court chose to half-heartedly abide by stare
decisis in reciting its strict scrutiny analysis, but not applying it. The result
is that the Grutter program survived, the Gratz program did not, and the
future of all others remains uncertain.
LIBBY HUSKEY

304.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment);
see supra text accompanying notes 273-76 detailing the ambiguities contained within the
narrow tailoring inquiry of the Grutter decision.
305. See supra notes 89, 122 and accompanying text.
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